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1. Introduction 
1.1 Governance assessments and the Paris declaration – compatible 
agendas? 
 
Is it possible to carry out governance assessments and develop diagnostic tools for enhancing 
governance while adhering to the principles of the Paris Declaration? Or, are the two processes 
largely contradictory? What measures can be taken to promote greater harmonisation and reduce 
transaction costs on recipient countries? This paper aims to highlight some issues and provoke a 
discussion on governance assessments in relation to the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness’ expressed goal of national ownership, harmonisation and alignment.  
 
There is by now a broad consensus among policymakers and academia that good governance 
matters for development and herein, for the effectiveness of development assistance. This in turn 
has increased the demand for monitoring the quality of governance and aid donors increasingly 
utilise measurable performance indicators – where governance features prominently- as a basis for 
aid disbursements. While a multitude of  motivations and purposes lie behind decisions to carry out 
governance appraisals, most assessments are used as a planning tool to enhance the effectiveness of 
aid and/or to facilitate aid conditionality (both ex ante and ex post). Thus, in the context of 
developing and aid recipient countries, governance assessments has come to mean donor initiated 
initiatives aimed at leveraging change and reform.  
 
In contrast, the Paris Declaration in its official rhetoric demands donors to ‘step back’ and 
harmonise and align aid, as well as foster country ownership of the development agenda. Advancing 
nationally determined development strategies means that development partners – i.e. donors – must 
subordinate their aid programmes to partner – i.e. recipient – national policy preferences. This, may 
however, constitute a dilemma when held up against external actors’ legitimate needs to carry out 
governance assessments. Development partner governments (and investors and civil society actors) 
may have policy agendas that are not always compatible with that of the partner country, and are 
also accountable to the electorates in their home countries. As a result, we need to acknowledge that 
the Paris Declaration and the growing process of assessing governance may be two largely 
contradictory agendas.  
 
According to the Paris Declaration country ownership is achieved when “partner countries exercise 
effective leadership over their development policies and strategies, and co-ordinate development 
actions”. It commits partner countries to three objectives of ownership:  
- Exercise leadership in developing and implementing their national development strategies 
through broad consultative processes. 
- Translate these into prioritised results-oriented operational programmes as expressed in 
medium-term expenditure frameworks and annual budgets (indicator)1. 
- Take the lead in co-ordinating aid at all levels in conjunction with other development 
resources in partnership with civil society and the private sector.  
                                                     
1 The principle of country ownership and how to ensure it is perhaps the least developed in the Paris Declaration.  This is 
for instance illustrated by the fact that only one of the objectives is translated into an indicator and is thus possible to 
monitor. Another limitation is that partner countries must have operational development strategies. The target for 2010 is 
that at least 75% of partner countries have such strategies in place (Paris Declaration 2005:9).  
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However, donor driven governance assessments do not necessarily stress the role of national 
partners nor national ownership in the assessment process and the question is whether they should.2 
In many respects, it is a contradiction in terms to expect that assessments by external parties should 
be owned by those being assessed. But, assessments can possibly be catalysts for nationally driven 
reform, especially if configured and undertaken through inclusive and consultative processes. For 
this to take place, alternative forms of assessments are most likely required. This paper will explore 
the peer review and self-assessment modalities as examples of such alternatives. 
 
The Paris Declaration also commits donors to align aid with partner countries national development 
strategies and to channel their support through the partner countries’ institutions and procedures. 
This is closely linked to ownership – in the sense that it embeds aid into country-led priorities, goals 
and targets. It does not link to ownership, if ownership is also understood to mean enhanced civic 
engagement, balancing state capacity with state responsiveness, rights-based service delivery, 
inclusive participation, transparency, and accountability.  So far, there are few examples of this 
taking place via governance assessments. Donor assessments are products of the donor agenda and 
were never meant to be aligned with partners’ strategies.  
 
The Paris Declaration’s call for more harmonised, transparent and collectively effective actions 
among donors includes working together “to reduce the number of separate, duplicative missions to 
the field and diagnostic reviews” (Paris Declaration 2005:6). In 2005, two thirds of missions and 
half of country analytical work were still uncoordinated indicating clear deficiencies in 
harmonisation (OECD 2007:2).3 Again illustrating the real and potential tensions between 
governance assessments and the Paris Declaration, a proliferation of governance assessments and 
diagnostic tools has been witnessed in recent years. There are several consequences of a 
proliferating assessment agenda linked to competing and multiple demands from donors on 
developing country governments and duplication of analytical work.  
 
In order to make these two conflicting agendas meet this paper argues that it is necessary to 
establish a new arena or a ‘third way’. A possible starting point could be to stimulate the 
undertaking of more self-assessments and peer-reviews. Although so far less frequently conducted 
than assessments by external parties, so-called self-assessments and peer-reviews may be more 
conducive with respect to fostering country ownership. They set out to be multi-stakeholder 
assessments including broad based participation. The involvement of key local stakeholders may 
also enhance the credibility and legitimacy of governance assessments. Not least these are national 
initiatives carried out on the initiative of the country government. Importantly, these forms of 
assessments in principle also imply less involvement by external actors. They are based on local 
‘know-how’, grounded in the local context and provide the best opportunity to entrench ownership 
of the development agenda.  
 
In the following, a brief overview of different categories of assessments is presented to provide an 
overview of the major debates and to introduce the main forms of assessments. Section two takes a 
closer look at what forms of governance assessments are most conducive with respect to upholding 
the principles of the Paris Declaration by introducing three main forms of assessments - being 
assessed, peer review and self-assessment. In the third section we sum up challenges and issues for 
discussion.  
 
                                                     
2 The Centre for Democratic Governance/UNDP preliminary study on Donor Governance Assessments finds almost no 
methodological evidence of national consultation in its review of OECD members’ use of governance assessments.  
3 The target for 2010 is that 40% of donor missions to the field are joint and that 66% of country analytic work is joint 
(Paris Declaration 2005:10).  
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1.2 Different approaches to governance assessments  
A range of different types of assessments exist and several countries and organisations use multiple 
types of assessments. Some are studies of political economy and drivers of change at the state level, 
while others are more focused on particular issues that are crucial from a governance perspective, 
such as human rights, corruption, accountability, capacity, conflict or transparency, within the 
country context. Studies of institutional quality and functioning or that examine the capacity issues 
within the enabling environment (for instance in the context of poverty reduction, for specific 
sectors such as health or education, or linked to organisations) are also common.  There are a 
number of different ways to distinguish between different groups and categories of assessments. 
 
One possibility is to group assessments according to who are behind the various initiatives. The 
Overseas Development Institute (2007) has applied this principle of categorisation:  
 
• Initiatives by multilateral actors: e.g. UNDP’s Governance Indicators Project (GIP), 
OECD’s Metagora project, World Bank’s World Wide Governance Indicators, EU’s 
Country Governance Profiles 
• Initiatives by bilateral actors: e.g. USAID’s Democracy and Governance Assessment, 
DfID’s Country Governance Assessments and Drivers of Change, the Dutch Strategic 
Governance and Corruption Assessment, Sida’s (Power and) Conflict Analysis. 
• Initiatives by independent research institutions: e.g. International IDEA’s State of 
Democracy Assessment, Bertelsmann Foundation’s Bertelsmann’s Transformation Index, 
the Freedom House scales, ODI/University of Florida’s World Governance Assessment 
Project, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index.  
 
Another option is to distinguish between the following three categories (and sub-categories):  
 
• Assessments: This category consists of three main forms of assessments - external 
assessments (e.g. DfID, the Netherlands, USAID), peer-reviews (OECD and the African 
Peer Review Mechanism) and self-assessments (e.g. International IDEA’s State of 
Democracy).  These are all methods and frameworks for assessments which include some 
case studies but no comparison or ranking of countries.  
• Indicators/indices: Mainly global datasets such as the Freedom House scales for political 
and civil liberties4, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s African governance assessment5 (recent 
initiative) and the Bertelsmann’s Transformation Index6, the polity IV Project at the 
University of Maryland7, and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index and 
the Global Integrity Index targeting the prevalence of corruption8. All of these are seen as 
indicators because they contain comparative data. Assessments as referred to above do not. 
Global and regional studies also belong in this category.9  
• Initiatives: OECD’s Metagora project and UNDP’s GIP are initiatives to promote self-
assessments through certain principles, approaches and methods (e.g. pro-poor and gender 
sensitive aggregation).10  
 
It should be noted that these are not clear-cut categories and there are several overlaps. Among the 
distinctive features of the World Governance Assessment (WGA) 11 is that it allows cross-country 
                                                     
4 See, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1 
5 See, http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/the-index.html 
6 See, http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/11.0.html?&L=1 
7 See, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/ 
8 See, http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi 
9 See, UNDP’s Users Guide, http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/policy-guide-IndicatorsUserGuide.pdf 
10 Notably, ODI (2007) refers to the initiatives within all the categories as assessments.  
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comparison; generates primary data, and; focuses primarily on quantitative data while also 
capturing qualitative comments (Hyden, Court, and Mease 2004; Hyden and Mease 2007). This 
makes the WGA a hybrid between assessment and comparative indicator set.  
 
A third possibility is to distinguish between assessment initiatives on the basis of the role of 
national authorities:  
 
• Being assessed by others or external assessments is currently the dominant form of 
assessment in existence, and refers to the large number of assessment carried out by 
development partners (and independent research institutions). Of the assessment initiatives 
promoted by donors, USAID’s Democracy and Governance Assessment (DGA) Framework 
stands out. By spring 2000 it had already been applied in a dozen countries on every 
continent and refined for over five years, and it is still ongoing. The Netherlands and the 
UK are in the process of piloting new comprehensive assessment initiatives, referred to as 
the Strategic Governance and Corruption Assessment (SGACA) and Country Governance 
Assessments (CGA) respectively. Other emerging donor assessment initiatives are EU’s 
Country Governance Profiles (CGP), CIDA’s Governance Profiling (GP), and the 
Sida/Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Power and) Conflict Analysis (PCA). 
• Peer based assessments are of a more recent date and are exemplified by the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM) which  is an instrument voluntarily acceded to by member 
states of the African Union as an African self-monitoring mechanism of the commitment to 
the promotion of democracy and good political governance (NEPAD 2003d).  
• A third form of assessment, self-assessment is undertaken by a country preferably on its 
own initiative. The most central self-assessment initiative is IDEA/University of Essex’ 
State of Democracy Assessment12.  
 
For the purposes of this conference, aiming to discuss governance assessments in light of the 
principles of the Paris Declaration, we have opted to focus on these three main forms of assessments 
emphasising the degree of partner country involvement in the assessments carried out.   
                                                                                                                                                                 
11 The assessments are now coordinated by researchers at ODI and the University of Florida, while the project first started 
at United Nations University.   
12 See, http://www.idea.int/democracy/index.cfm 
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2. Three main forms of assessment: Country level 
experiences   
Below, we take a closer look at how governance assessments work in view of the Paris Declaration. 
We do so by looking at the three main approaches to governance assessments outlined above and 
illustrating these initiatives with country level experiences.  
2.1 Being assessed by external parties  
Assessments are commonly “completely or largely external to the country for which the assessment 
is carried out” (ODI 2007: 4). The main external governance assessments can be grouped into two 
categories: independent research institutions mostly located in the North and bilateral and 
multilateral development partners that employ a combination of internally derived governance 
assessments and the assessment tools of research institutions to measure their development country 
profiles and progress within the field of governance in partner countries.  
 
In the event of in-country work, this is generally carried out by international consultants. As 
emphasised above, development partners have legitimate reasons for carrying out individual and 
varied governance assessments linked to their own individual agendas and distinct aid portfolios. 
These assessments are increasingly used to support decisions in business investments, donor 
allocations and in some instances research priorities. In terms of the Millennium Development 
Goals, governance indicators and assessments are considered vital in order to reach and implement 
strategic policy decisions. Thus, development partners undertake appraisals of governance for their 
own purposes and assessments are often closely associated with their foreign and aid policy. While 
legitimate in their own right, the nature of external governance assessments as currently witnessed 
places clear limitations on ownership. In addition, the observed tendency of proliferation of the 
various governance assessments and limited ability of external parties to build on each other 
initiatives is a critical issue that should be addressed by development partners.  
External assessments in light of the Paris Declaration  
Harmonisation 
Arguably, the poorest, most aid dependent countries with marked governance challenges appear to 
be exposed to more governance assessment initiatives than more developed countries. From the 
perspective of developing governance capacity, it is also a concern that these initiatives appear 
poorly integrated and that the various assessments rarely build on each others findings. Zambia 
offers an illustration.  
 
Zambia launched its fifth national development plan in early 2007. On this basis, its development 
partners drafted a Joint Assistance Strategy which aims to harmonise donor interventions in line 
with the Paris Declaration. Indicating an element of national self-assessment, the government of 
Zambia has committed itself to publish a yearly report on the state of governance in Zambia and a 
newly established governance secretariat is put in charge of monitoring progress in terms of 
governance. However, along side these initiatives, a number of largely unconnected external 
governance assessments are taking place that threaten to duplicate and sideline the national 
governance assessment process. The European Commission has recently completed an extensive 
governance profile, Denmark is currently reviewing its governance programme to Zambia, OECD-
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DAC has announced plans of a procurement review while DfID is in the process of completing its 
Country Governance analysis, Norway has completed similar assessments and the Dutch 
government plans a Strategic Governance and Corruption Assessment (SGACA).  
 
The large variety of indicators and assessment methodologies employed runs counter to the focus 
on harmonisation and directly competes with the national governance initiatives. A similar 
perspective is presented in the country paper on Malawi which shows that in addition to (but not 
linked to) the recently conducted Peer Review Process and national governance initiatives linked to 
its Poverty Reduction Strategy Process, a number of governance assessments have been carried out 
in the past two years for largely uncoordinated purposes and by a multitude of development partners 
and research institutions.  
Alignment and national ownership 
The two cases of Malawi and Zambia point to another paradox of the Paris Club Declaration’s 
emphasis on ownership and alignment to national development plans in the area of governance: 
How ‘national’ are the national development plans as expressed in the PRSP documents? For most 
aid dependent countries, the PRSP strategies were explicit demands placed by development partners 
in order to qualify for the debt relief mechanisms. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) 
initiated by the World Bank and IMF for forging poverty reduction in the context of debt relief 
programmes are maybe the most direct attempts by the international donor community to seek to 
enhance commitment to poor and accountability to poverty reduction from the outside. Countries 
requesting debt-relief under the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative were required to 
adopt a Poverty Reduction Strategy developed through a broad participatory process (PRSP). Tied 
to a set of governance conditionalities, the PRSPs have placed issues of poverty reduction at the 
centre stage of the official agenda in a number of debtor countries. As a result, it may be argued that 
even in ‘the best of circumstances’ where external governance assessments actually do link their 
assessments to national development plans, the very same plans have been forged and often initiated 
by the same external actors.  
External governance assessments and the Paris Declaration- scope for improvements? 
The country examples provided above show that there are a number of inbuilt dilemmas in the 
processes of forging sustainable ‘good governance’ and at the same time adhere to the principles of 
national ownership, harmonisation and alignment as established in the Paris Declaration.  
 
One argument put forth is that donors should support and build their policy formulation on 
independent and more detailed governance assessments carried out by independent research 
institutions and with a strong element of national participation and national capacity building 
included. The World Governance Assessment (WGA) is an example of a governance assessment 
that is carried out by external actors, yet is context specific and includes local stakeholder views 
(Hyden et al. 2004). Being independent of various donor agendas and with data being collected by 
local respondents, the WGA is considered cost effective and meets many of the criteria set for a 
good assessment. However, this initiative does not meet the apparent need of various external 
parties to carry out governance assessments that carry their own ‘trade mark’ (often responding to 
policy directions from domestic policy debates).  It may also be argued that the WGA initiative only 
to a limited extent meet the need of building onto a nationally derived and owned governance 
process. 
 
The examples above have emphasised the need for further harmonisation of governance 
assessments and externally led initiatives, it may also be argued that harmonisation entails some in-
built contradictions. Recently, concern has been raised about donors ‘ganging up’ on recipient 
governments and through harmonised donor strategies being able to exert even stronger influence 
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on development partner policies. This could further compromise the Paris Declaration’s principle of 
national ownership (Foresti et al. 2006:x). The case of Uganda offers some insights to this 
problematique. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Being assessed by peers  
Peer review is based on a non-coercive approach and is an assessment of a state by other states 
(peers). It includes a stage of self-assessment prior to the peer review. This modality of assessment 
involves a number of actors including the organisation or collective body within which the review is 
conceptualised, organised and undertaken, the reviewed country team and the team of reivew 
countries. Vital factors for a successful peer review are mutual trust between the actors involved, as 
well as commitment and confidence in the process. Peer pressure is decisive for the effectiveness of 
Box 1: Harmonisation and national ownership – the paradox of Uganda 
To what extent can democratic accountability be enhanced by external support? Can national 
governments’ responsiveness and accountability towards poverty reduction be enhanced by 
international pressure? Or, are there circumstances in which external pressure and intervention 
may ‘crowd out’ internal mechanisms of democratic accountability? The case of Uganda 
illustrates one of the dilemmas faced by a largely externally driven governance (and 
assessment) agenda in the almost ‘ideal’ situation of donor harmonisation. The development 
partners in Uganda have come a long way to implement the policy goals of the Paris 
Declaration. Since 2003, 17 partner institutions have developed a joint dialogue on governance 
with the Government of Uganda based on a methodology for a joint monitoring process. 
Partners for Democracy and Governance (the PDG group) links its governance assessment to 
the government’s own commitments as displayed in the governance section of the national 
development plan, the Poverty Eradication and Action Plan (PEAP). But the case of Uganda also 
displays the potential costs of harmonisation in situations where the partner countries begin to 
question government’s commitment to the governance agenda. Before the 2006 elections, the 
harmonised governance process and demands of the PDG group at times led to decisions that 
overruled the vote in Parliament. According to developing partner representatives, the PDG 
process has also meant that the dialogue on governance increasingly is pushed to the highest 
executive level, thereby potentially undermining local democratic processes. 
Key Discussion Points 
¾ In view of the donor governments varied aid portfolios and assessment needs, is 
greater harmonisation of governance assessments possible? When do individual 
governance assessments by various donor agencies constitute a problem in light of 
the Paris Declaration?  
¾ To what extent can national development plans as expressed in the PRSP documents 
be considered as ‘genuinely national’ and to what extent does lack of ownership affect 
the assessment and implementation process? 
¾ Donor support and harmonised processes must not diminish accountability to 
domestic stakeholders. While this principle is clear, how can this be avoided in 
practice? When and how may external pressure and a harmonised donor approach to 
governance risk ‘crowding out’ internal mechanisms of democratic accountability? 
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the review and takes the form of ‘soft enforcement’ as opposed to legal enforcement mechanisms 
(Pagani 2002). There are two major peer review initiatives in existence: the African Peer Review 
Mechanism and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD)13 peer 
reviews.  
 
The APRM has been modelled on the latter in a number of significant respects and is the most 
recent initiative. The APRM is unique in the sense that it is the first working peer review framework 
to help improve governance within African countries and which is initiated to help promote 
collective action. The mechanism’s main aim is “to foster the adoption of policies, standards and 
practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, and sustainable development and 
accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration” (NEPAD 2003:1)14. Its base 
document was first approved by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and later 
endorsed by the African Union (AU) in July 2002. As of May 2007 26 countries of 53 AU member 
states had acceded to APRM. Ghana, Rwanda and Kenya were the first three countries where 
support missions and country review missions were undertaken, with Ghana pioneering the process.  
 
The APRM mechanism is supposed to be a continuous exercise of assessment and implementation 
taking place in 5 year cycles, thus placing the APRM among the most ambitious assessment 
exercises on the African continent. Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda and Mauritius were the four first 
countries to open themselves to the examinations of the APRM. Their experiences provide the first 
lessons to learn from the APRM. As will be seen, peer assessments are in theory more compatible 
with the Paris Declaration’s goal of national ownership and alignment than assessments by external 
parties. The assessment relies heavily on a self-assessment carried out in the country concerned 
which also constitutes the first step of the review process15.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
13 Peer reviews have been used by the OECD since the organisation was founded and focuses on various areas such as 
governance, economics, education, health, environment and energy (OECD 2003).  
14 The main focus areas are: democracy and political governance; economic governance and management; corporate 
governance; and socio-economic development (NEPAD 2003). 
15 The APRM consists of a five step review process: (1) a self-assessment is undertaken in the country concerned; (2) a 
country review team composed of members of the APRM panel of ‘eminent persons’ carries out an independent 
evaluation and produces report with assistance from the APRM Secretariat and technical advisers; (3) a programme of 
action is developed based on the self-assessment report and the country review report; (4) the country review report and 
the plan of action are presented at the APR Forum, and; (5) the plan of action and country review report are tabled at the 
African Union Summit and then made public (NEPAD 2003). 
Box 2: Two Regional Assessment Initiatives: The EU and the APRM 
An interesting contrast to the APRM is the governance assessments related to European Union 
admission in Europe. While the APRM consists of a self-assessment part in combination with an 
external review the EU criteria are currently in the form of a top-down external evaluation only. 
As Richard Rose (2006) argues, however, the rather broad 1993 Copenhagen criteria (practice 
of democracy, adherence to the rule of law, respect for human and minority rights, functioning 
market economy, and effective public administration) which set the standard for evaluation of 
potential EU members can also be used in a bottom-up application. By relating 2004 survey 
data from the New Europe Barometer (asking people what they think of how they are governed) 
to the Copenhagen criteria this could offer a counterweight to the current asymmetry in 
negotiations between the EU and applicant countries, as it provides and empowers the 
applicant with more information about the functioning of its governance system. 
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Peer review in light of the Paris Declaration  
Ownership and alignment 
One of the distinctive features of the APRM and which sets it apart from externally driven review 
initiatives is its focus on ownership realised through the self-assessment component of the 
mechanism and the emphasis on participatory and inclusive approaches (NEPAD 2003b para. 7.3-
7.19; 2003a). It is considered necessary to involve all stakeholders through a broad consultative 
process. In addition the added value of this being a regional African initiative should not be 
underestimated. Some concern, however, has been raised with respect to NEPAD’s agenda. It has 
been accused of being elitist, oriented towards the West, and an African version of the 
conditionality policies advanced by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in African 
countries (Verwey 2004).  
 
During the Sixth Africa Governance Forum in 2006, most country submissions recognised that the 
APRM process had increased space for non-state actors (AGV-VI 2006:14) which is a significant 
achievement. Notwithstanding this, there is also considerable room for improvement with respect to 
expanding and deepening ownership. Civil society participation in the APRM has for instance 
posed a dilemma in Mauritius, Kenya and Rwanda. The first phase of the review in Mauritius has 
been flawed by poor civil society engagement. The focal point for the APRM in Mauritius – NESC 
– failed in reaching out broadly and reportedly relied too heavily on government information when 
preparing the self-assessment report (Bunwaree 2007).  
 
Assessments of the Kenyan and Rwandan APRM reviews identify weak civil society engagement as 
a main challenge in both countries (Ouma Akoth 2007; LDGL 2007). The Kenyan process has been 
referred to as ‘state-centric’ but at the same time the author admits that it presents an opportunity for 
dialogue between the government and civil society (Ouma Akoth 2007). Overall, the APRM 
process in Ghana is considered as successful (see Box 3) - also with respect to stakeholder 
involvement. Representative stakeholder participation has been good, but it has been noted that 
public awareness and involvement have been weaker (UNDP 2006).   
 
 
 
 
 
The APRM is largely self-funded i.e. less than 20% of the budget is donor funded the rest comes 
from NEPAD APRM countries. The fact remains, however, that the African Development Bank, 
United Nations Development Programme, and the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa have participated in all APRM missions and provided technical, human and financial support 
(AGV-VI 2006). Financial contributions from other aid actors have also been called on. The UK 
and Germany for instance provided support to the Ghana APRM. The question is what are the 
implications for long term sustainability and ensuring inclusive national ownership?  
Box 3: The APRM Story in Ghana 
The APRM in Ghana has been held out as a model example. It was the first country to complete 
the APRM  (AGV-VI 2006). Extensive national political support for the APRM process has been 
pointed to as key to the success. An independent 7 member APRM Governing Council composed 
of non-state actors selected in a transparent manner following public consultation played an 
important role in the process.  Also, the quality of the institutions involved has been pointed to 
as a success factor (Bing-Pappoe 2007). Weaknesses of the process are particularly found in 
implementation. This is a feature the Ghana APRM process shares with other APRM countries. A 
limited timeframe to discuss and draft the Plan of Action has been pointed to as possible 
explanatory factors (UNDP 2006).  
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According to the APRM guidelines (NEPAD 2003c, par. 12) the national programme of action 
developed as part of the assessment should be consistent and aligned with the existing national 
processes such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, other poverty reduction national 
strategies, Medium Term Expenditure Framework and the Millennium Development Goals 
strategies. The APRM mechanism is still in its early stages and there is yet little information on the 
link between the APRM and the Paris Declaration’s principle of alignment. It seems reasonable to 
assume, however, that it would be in the interest of the country concerned to align its national 
programme with peer review processes. As previously mentioned, however, alignment to national 
plans that are partly products of external demands could be considered a paradox and could possibly 
work against ownership.  
Harmonisation  
The APRM is resource intensive and demanding.  A strong monitoring and evaluation 
system is for instance needed to ensure effective implementation of the national plan of 
action which is at the core of the APRM (AGV-VI 2006:29). If donors are not willing to 
harmonise their actions and draw on the peer reviews conducted, the APRM runs the risk of 
just becoming another add on to country systems that are already experiencing  excessive 
external demands.  In Rwanda lack of technical expertise at the national level was a 
problem during the APRM process (LDGL 2007). Evidence from other APRM countries 
also indicate lack of capacity at regional and country level to manage the tasks associated 
with the process (AGV-VI 2006).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Self-assessments: National governance assessment strategies  
The principle of self-assessment entails a country undertaking a reflective and systematic evaluation 
of its own national governance processes. The advantage of the self-assessment approach lies 
particularly in its potential for building local capacity by investing in and drawing on local ‘know 
how’. Nationally ‘owned’ databases can be established which local stakeholders in turn can use to 
advance demands and interests. In this sense, self-assessments in a long-term perspective can 
contribute to empowering the citizenry.  
 
Key Discussion Points: 
 
¾ The APRM process is focused on ownership and broad consultative processes. It has 
for instance succeeded in creating more space for civil society actors. How can 
external actors contribute to advance this positive achievement?   
¾ Civil society engagement has also posed a dilemma during the APRM processes. 
Which parts of civil society should be involved and how should it be involved? How 
can further involvement of civil society be enhanced? 
¾ When and how does external involvement place limitations on ownership? 
¾ Development partners can reduce transaction costs on recipient countries by drawing 
on the peer reviews undertaken and keep their own assessments at a minimum. How to 
make sure that peer reviews are utilised by governments and development partners? 
Will external actors be willing to do this? Is it feasible and /or desirable for donors to 
do this? 
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As noted above, the APRM consists of a self-monitoring mechanism and is thus partly overlapping 
with this third form of appraisal. Although relatively infrequent, what may be termed self-
appraisals, are embarked on both in the West and in developing countries. Initiatives include the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance’s (IDEA) State of Democracy 
project, as well as democratic audits and publicly financed power studies16. The latter is a 
Scandinavian phenomenon17. The assessments have been characterised by a relatively long time 
frame, extensive autonomy and reliable and solid funding (see Box 4). UNDPs Governance 
Indicator Project (GIP) and OECD’s Metagora project are also related to this form of assessment 
although these initiatives are not assessments per se.  
 
Self-assessments may use internationally developed frameworks and approaches, adapting them to 
national and local needs. International IDEA’s self-assessment approach has been piloted by in-
country teams in eight countries in association with researchers from Leeds University (Bangladesh, 
El Salvador, Italy, Kenya, Malawi, New Zealand, Peru, South Korea), in addition the framework 
has been applied in assessments in South Asia, Australia, Mongolia and the Philippines among 
other countries. The method is comprehensive and focuses on assessing the functioning of 
democracy including progress and setbacks in developed and developing democracies according to 
a common model. Among its main aims are: to raise public awareness, spark discussions, provide 
systematic evidence of governance, help identify areas for reform, and assess how effective reforms 
are in practice (Beetham 2004: 4-5; Beetham et al. 2002:10).  
 
The Governance Indicators Project of the UNDP is also wide in scope and endeavours to (1) build 
the capacities of national stakeholders in the use and development of indicators; (2) assist in the 
development of indicators around national development plans, and; (3) refine new and existing 
indicators in order to ensure that they are pro-poor and gender sensitive. Countries in which 
assessment missions have been undertaken include Afghanistan, Philippines, Malawi and Mongolia 
(Scott and Wilde 2006)18. The project builds onto International IDEA’s work and also relies on 
other strategic partnerships (OECD Metagora network, University of Essex, DIAL and InWent).  
                                                     
16 For instance the Democratic Audit carried out in the UK. To date three audits have been carried out in the UK. Several 
countries have used the democratic audit methodology. For more information on this see,  
http://www.democraticaudit.com/auditing_democracy/auditsworld.php  The State of Democracy project builds onto the 
UK audits.  
17 A total of five Scandinavian studies of power and democracy have been undertaken. The first was launched in Norway 
in 1972 when the Norwegian government commissioned a group of researchers to examine how power was distributed. 
This was followed by a Swedish study in the 1980s exhibiting great similarities with its Norwegian predecessor. A second 
round of power and democracy studies were initiated in the latter half of the 1990s, starting with Sweden in 1997, and 
Norway and Denmark in 1998. The Norwegian and Danish assessments were undertaken within a five-year period 
(concluded in 2003) and were largely parallel in nature, while the second Swedish study was less ambitious in scope 
(lasted for 3 years) and led by a parliamentary committee, not a steering committee composed of researchers. 
18 See also http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs06/about_the_governance_indicators_project.pdf 
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Box 4 The Norwegian study of power and democracy 19 
Two power and democracy studies have been undertaken in Norway, the last was conducted in the 
period from 1997-2003 and was a follow up to the study from the 1970s. The project was launched 
by the Norwegian Parliament and a steering committee consisting of five independent researchers 
was assigned responsibility for the project and enjoyed a wide mandate (NOU 2003). NOK 50 
million (approx. US$8 million) were allocated to the project. A central outcome of the analysis has 
been the organisation and accumulation of a database of findings and arguments which can be 
used by different actors to impact on politics and to demand changes and advance demands. Close 
to 40 books and more than 100 articles/reports were produced as part of the investigation. The 
final report was given a wide dissemination through an official hearing process and was followed 
by the presentation of a white paper to Parliament. As a member of the steering committee states: 
“The process had legitimacy and autonomy. We could do what we wanted and no one could stick 
their nose into the process. No one could intervene.” 
 
 
Self-assessment in light of the Paris Declaration  
Ownership and alignment 
Self-assessments should in principle provide ideal conditions for fostering ownership and avoiding 
a paternalistic relationship. One of the distinctive features of IDEA’s assessment framework is 
exactly the focus on country ownership of the assessment process. A basic assumption of the 
framework is that a country’s own citizens should assess its democracy (Beetham et al. 2001; 
Beetham et al. 2002). In the same vain, UNDP’s GIP is “designed to provide support to nationally 
owned processes for assessing and monitoring democratic governance”.20 A stated goal is to provide 
internal upward pressure for reform and to ensure that governance indicator systems become tools 
for accountability mechanisms by local stakeholders.  
 
Setting out to be quite flexible in approach, the IDEA initiative to a greater extent than other 
assessments seems to ground action in the contextual realities of the countries concerned. Mongolia 
was the first country to conduct an assessment according to the IDEA assessment guidelines within 
a government led process including all stakeholders. The process is referred to as successful in 
terms of creating multi-stakeholder ownership.  The development of democratic indicators 
including country specific characteristics has been put forward as key, and the process also 
illustrates that it is possible to deploy a comparative perspective and still entrench ownership 
(UNDP 2006; Hulan 2007).  
 
In a developing country context, the external presence is still there in the form of outsiders 
providing ‘assistance’ during the process.  The Mongolian assessment involved a host of external 
actors which provided advice, training, technical assistance, and financial support (UNDP 2006; 
Hulan 2007). The question is whether it is possible to entrench real ownership when the initiative is 
dependent on funding from external partners? Is it really home-grown? Would these countries have 
undertaken the assessment without the external ‘drive’? Taking into account the multiple 
assessments undertaken in for instance Malawi and Zambia, what is the likelihood of these 
governments taking on even more without some kind of external encouragement?  
                                                     
19 The contents of this box is partly based on information provided by Per Selle in an interview conducted 16.08.2007 by 
Lise Rakner and Vibeke Wang. Professor Selle was member of the research group commissioned by the Norwegian 
Parliament to compile a report on Power and Democracy in Norway in the period 1998-2003.  
20 See, http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/flagship/governance_indicators_project.html 
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Alignment with national development plans (e.g. second generation PRSPs) and other political 
commitments should be taken into account during the self-assessment process. The UNDP approach 
is most explicit about the objective of alignment of governance to national development planning 
and delivery. This was one of the factors influencing the selection of indicators for the Mongolian 
DGI framework. A central dilemma in relation to ownership and alignment is how to overcome the 
fact that in terms of method, funding and intellectual origin self-assessment initiatives are largely 
externally driven. What implications does the external presence of donors have on possibilities for 
developing nationally owned databases and findings? 
 
Harmonisation  
There is considerable overlap between the UNDP and IDEA initiatives. UNDP bases its framework 
for selecting pro-poor and gender sensitive indicators on the basic principles and mediating values 
of IDEA’s State of Democracy methodology, but adds to it by distinguishing between four senses in 
which indicators might be considered pro-poor or gender sensitive. Making use of the same 
frameworks is commendable in terms of harmonisation. A challenge with respect to achieving 
greater harmonisation is however that these assessments do not take into account the needs of 
external agents that have to account back to their home constituencies and that administer specific 
and different aid portfolios. This in turn constrains the willingness and ability of donors to 
harmonise assessments efforts and draw on the self-assessments which are undertaken.  
 
 
Key discussion points 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 5 The Democratic Governance Indicator framework in Mongolia 
Mongolia’s self-assessment was undertaken according to the IDEA methodology (adapting it to 
a national context with guidance provided by UNDP). The development of a Democratic 
Governance Indicators (DGIs) framework was part of the follow-up to the 5th International 
Conference on New and Restored Democracies (ICNRD-5) held in the fall of 2003 in 
Ulaanbaatar. The ICNRD-5 adopted the Ulaanbaatar Declaration and Plan of Action which 
commit governments to instigate plans to strengthen democracy and establish mechanisms to 
assess the development over time. Other main components of the follow-up project were the 
development of a Country Information Note, a National Plan of Action, and a Civil Society Index. 
The Mongolia DGI process was led by a team of national researchers and appointed by the 
Government. The committee was selected in April 2005 and the final assessment report was 
presented in May 2006. Some of the reported key lessons learned from the DGI process are: the 
process should be nationally owned and at the same time draw on international expertise; it 
should be adapted to the country context but still include a comparative element; it should 
adopt a mixed, multi-disciplinary methodology, and; it should be institutionalised through 
establishment of national institutions and mechanisms. Mongolia’s adoption of the Ninth MDG 
on democratic governance is by many seen as a way of institutionalising democracy 
assessment and democratic development (UNDP 2006; Hulan 2007). 
¾ In terms of method, funding and intellectual origin self-assessment initiatives are 
largely external. How can this dilemma be overcome?  
¾ Self-appraisal is the form of assessment which in principle is most conducive for 
entrenching national ownership. How can external actors make the most of this form 
of assessment?  
¾ Does self-assessments sufficiently meet donors’ assessment needs? Aid actors have 
different purposes for measuring governance as well as different values. How can 
self-assessments be structured so that they also meet some of these needs?  
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4. A summary of challenges and issues for discussion 
We started the paper with a provocative question considering the purpose of this conference: Are 
the Paris Declaration and the process of assessing governance contradictory agendas?  
 
1. Linking the Paris Declaration’s principles of harmonisation, alignment and ownership to 
three main forms of governance assessments (being assessed, peer review mechanisms and 
self assessment initiatives), the paper has pointed to a set of dilemmas, issues for further 
discussion and some potential solutions. A key challenge in terms of implementing the 
Paris Declaration is exposed in the observed proliferation of governance assessment 
initiatives: Development partners have their own individual agendas and administer distinct 
aid portfolios which may conflict with local needs and interests. The Paris Declaration 
commits donors to harmonise and align aid and thus puts the development community to 
test. So far, however, the Paris Declaration has not been driving the development. 
 
2. The observed proliferation in governance assessments holds the potential risk of duplicating 
work already carried out, setting competing and multiple demands, emphasising short time 
frames, ignoring problems of capacity and to further the administrative costs of aid. The 
problems encountered are exacerbated by the fact that poor, aid dependent countries are 
exposed to more assessments than countries with more governance capacity.  
 
3. The increase in governance assessment initiatives is partly linked to a diffuse governance 
agenda. While aid agencies acknowledge that governance matters for development 
performance and aid effectiveness their understanding of governance may differ.  
 
4. In order to merge the process of developing diagnostic tools for enhancing governance and 
the principles of the Paris Declaration, it is necessary to establish a new arena or a ‘third 
way’. A possible starting point could be to stimulate the undertaking of more self-
assessments and peer-reviews. These forms of assessments in principle imply less 
involvement by external actors. They are based on local ‘know-how’, grounded in the local 
context and provide the best opportunity to entrench ownership of the development agenda.  
 
5. While recognising external partners’ valid need to undertake governance assessments, the 
current proliferation in governance appraisals is excessive and unnecessary. To address 
problems of proliferation, all external assessments should be aligned with, and draw on 
existing self-assessments and peer-review mechanisms. Moving towards more self-
assessments is also sensible seen against the international trend towards less use of aid 
conditionality.  
 
6. Political conditionality is a sensitive area of development aid and has largely been proved to 
be ineffective. The aid hegemony of the West is now challenged by non-traditional donors 
such as China and Brazil. If Western aid actors push too hard the risk of over-politicising 
the agenda is considerable. This could backfire and will most likely harm those that need 
the aid the most – the citizens of poor aid dependent countries. This again points towards 
support for self-assessment initiatives hereunder assistance in building local capacity, 
databases and empirical evidence which local stakeholders in turn can use to advance 
demands and interests.  
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Table 1. Key questions for further discussion  
 
 
 
 
Paris Declaration principles Form of assessment 
Ownership/alignment Harmonisation Examples of 
assessment 
frameworks 
Donor assessments Can such assessments 
be owned by national 
governments? Is 
ownership realistic? 
Given the often 
incompatible drivers, 
is greater 
harmonisation 
possible? When do 
individual governance 
assessments by donor 
agencies constitute a 
problem in light of the 
Paris Declaration?  
DGA (USAID), 
SGACA (the 
Netherlands), CGP 
(EU), CGA (DfID), 
GP (CIDA), PCA 
(Sida, MoFA).  
Peer reviews Is ownership more 
realistic? How can 
further civil society 
engagement be 
enhanced? When and 
how does external 
involvement place 
limitations on 
ownership? 
Is it possible to 
increase harmonisation 
by stimulating the 
undertaking of peer-
reviews? Will donors 
utilise these 
assessments?  
APRM, OECD 
Self-assessments Is ownership most 
realistic? Is ownership 
possible when the 
initiative and the 
intellectual ‘drive’ are 
external?  
Is it possible to 
increase harmonisation 
by stimulating the 
undertaking of self-
assessments? Will 
donors utilise these 
assessments?  What if 
governance backslides 
and donors and 
development partner 
governments have 
diverging goals? 
IDEA State of 
Democracy 
(UNDP’s GIP and 
OECD’s Metagora) 
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